9 9 5 a r t I C l e S Regret is a universal human experience [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] . The experience of regret modifies future actions 1,4,6 . However, regret in other mammals has never been identified; it is not known whether nonhuman mammals are capable of experiencing regret. Although nonhuman animals cannot verbally express regret, one can create regret-inducing situations and ask whether those regret-inducing situations influence neurophysiological representations or behavior: do nonhuman animals demonstrate the neural correlates of regret in potential regret-inducing situations?
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When evaluating the experience of regret, it is important to differentiate regret from disappointment 4, 7, 8 . Disappointment is the realization that a realized outcome is worse than expected 7, 8 ; regret is the realization that the worse than expected outcome is due to one's own mistaken action [1] [2] [3] 9 . Disappointment can be differentiated from regret through differences in the recognition of alternatives 2, 6, 8, 10 . Regret can be defined as the recognition that the option taken resulted in a worse outcome than an alternative option or action would have. The revaluation of the previous choice in context of the current choice is the economic foundation of regret 4, 6 .
Humans with damage to the orbitofrontal cortex (OFC) do not express regret 2 , and functional magnetic resonance imaging experiments reveal activity in the orbitofrontal cortex during regret 1, 11 . In rats and nonhuman primates, the OFC has been implicated in decision-making, particularly in the role of expectations of future reward and the complex calculations of inferred reward [12] [13] [14] [15] [16] [17] . Orbitofrontal cortical neurons represent the chosen value of an expected future reward 14, 18, 19 , and earlier research suggested that an intact OFC is critical for reversal learning 20, 21 (recent evidence suggests that OFC may have a more specialized role and is not necessary for reversal learning, at least in primates 22 ). Orbitofrontal cortex has been hypothesized to be critical for learning and decision-making 10, 15, 23, 24 , particularly in the evaluation of expected outcomes 14, 25 .
The ventral striatum (vStr) has also been implicated in evaluation of outcomes [26] [27] [28] [29] , particularly in evaluation during the process of decision-making 23, 29, 30 . Neural recordings vStr and OFC in rats have found representations of reward, value and prediction of expected value in both structures 12, 25, 29, [31] [32] [33] . In the rat, lesion studies suggest that orbitofrontal cortex is necessary for recognition of reward-related changes that require inference, such as flavor and kind, while vStr is necessary for recognition of any changes that affect value 15, 23 . In rats deliberating at choice points, vStr reward representations are transiently active before and during the reorientation process 29 , but reward representations in OFC are only active after the reorientation process is complete 25 .
We developed a neuroeconomic spatial decision-making task for rats, Restaurant Row, in which the rat encounters a serial sequence of take or skip choices. The Restaurant Row task consisted of an inner loop approximately 1 m in diameter, with four spokes radiating from the inner loop ( Fig. 1a) . At the end of each spoke, a feeder supplied a different flavor of food: banana, cherry, chocolate or unflavored. Flavor locations remained constant throughout the experiment. Rats were trained to run around the loop, making stay or skip decisions as they passed each spoke.
Zones were defined to differentiate each spoke. Upon entering each zone, rats encountered different offers of delays. Zone entries were defined entirely by the detected position of the rat's head and were not explicitly marked on the track. On entry into a zone, a tone sounded; the pitch of the tone indicated the delay the rat had to wait to receive a reward (higher pitch representing longer delay). As long as the rat stayed within the zone, the delay counted down, with each subsequent second indicated by a lower pitch tone. If the rat left the zone, the offer was rescinded: the countdown stopped, no sound was played and the rat's only option was to proceed on to the next spoke and the next zone.
The delays were independently selected pseudorandomly from a uniform distribution ranging from 1 to 30 s (for two of the rats) or 1 to 45 s (for the other two). The delay offered at each zone encounter was independent of that offered at other zones for that lap. When making a r t I C l e S a decision to stay or skip at a given zone (when offered a given delay), the only information the rat had was the flavor of the food offered (flavor locations remained constant throughout the experiment), the delay it would have to wait (delay signaled by pitch of the auditory cue) and the probability distribution of any future offers (offers were drawn from a uniform distribution of 1-30 s or 1-45 s).
Rats ran one 60-min session per day. This time limit meant that rats had a time budget of 60 min to spend foraging for food. Because the session was time-limited, the decision to stay or skip a zone was not independent of the other zones: waiting at one zone was time that could have been spent at another zone. An economically maximizing rat should distribute its time among the offers, waiting for valuable offers but skipping expensive offers. Assuming that an animal likes some flavors more than others, the economic value of an offer should depend on the delay offered and the animal's preferences.
RESULTS

Revealed preferences
We trained four rats on the Restaurant Row task ( Fig. 1) . Thresholds and preferences were determined by using an economic framework. All four rats showed similar behaviors in that they were likely to wait through the delay for delays less than a threshold, but unlikely to wait through the delay for delays greater than a threshold. When rats skipped an option, they left within the first ~5 s, independent of delay ( Supplementary Fig. 1 ). The threshold between waiting and skipping tended to be different for the different flavors for a given rat ( Fig. 1b and Supplementary Fig. 1 ). The fact that rats either stayed through the entire delay or left after a very stable 3 s implies that rats were not waiting for a specific delay cue but were making economic decisions based on the delay offered ( Supplementary Fig. 1 ). These thresholds were consistent within a rat but differed among rats ( Fig. 1c-e ), indicating an underlying revealed, economic preference for each flavor of food that did not change across a session ( Supplementary Fig. 2 ). There were no differences in reward handling between delays; rats generally waited 20-25 s after reward delivery before leaving for the next zone ( Supplementary Fig. 3 ).
To directly test whether the rats were making economic decisions (comparing value and cost), we ran two of the rats, after completing the primary Restaurant Row experiment, on a variant of the task in which one reward site provided three times as much food as the other three sites. In this control task, rats were run in four 20-min blocks, so that each site could be the large reward site for one block. (The order of which reward site provided excess reward was varied pseudorandomly. Rats were removed to a nearby resting location for 1 min between blocks.) Rats were consistently willing to wait longer for more food ( Supplementary  Fig. 4 ). All results reported here except for those in Supplementary  Figure 4 are from the primary Restaurant Row experiment.
Reward responses
We recorded 951 neurons from orbitofrontal cortex (OFC) and 633 neurons from ventral striatum (vStr) (see Supplementary Fig. 5 for recording locations). Neurons were identified as reward-responsive if their activity during the 3 s following reward delivery was significantly different (P < 0.05, Wilcoxon) than a bootstrapped (n = 500) sample of activity during 3-s windows taken randomly across the entire session 25, 29 . 81% of OFC neurons responded to reward; 86% of vStr neurons responded to reward. Responses in both OFC and vStr often differentiated among the four reward sites ( Supplementary Figs. 6 and 7) .
Because responses differentiated among rewards, a decoding algorithm applied to these neural ensembles should be able to distinguish among the reward sites. We used a Bayesian decoding algorithm with a training set defined by the neuronal firing rate in the 3 s following delivery of reward (which we used to calculate p(spikes | reward)) or a training set defined by the neuronal firing rate in the 3 s following entry into a zone (which we used to calculate p(spikes | zone)). To provide a control for unrelated activity, we also included a fifth condition in our calculation, the average neuronal firing rate during times the rat was not in any countdown zone. Thus, the training set consisted of five expected firing rates: firing rate after reward receipt or zone entry (i) at banana, (ii) at cherry, (iii) at chocolate, (iv) at unflavored and (v) on the rest of the maze. From this training set, Bayesian decoding uses the population firing rate at a given time to derive the posterior probability of the representation p(reward | spikes) or p(zone | spikes). For simplicity, we will refer to these two measures as p(reward) and p(zone).
To pool data from all four sites, we categorized and rotated each reward site on the basis of the current position of the rat. This gave us four sites that progressed in a serial manner: the previous site, the Each panel shows the stay or go decisions for all encounters of a single rat running a single session (R210-2011-02-02). A small vertical jitter has been added for display purposes. Thresholds were fit as described in the Online Methods. (f-i) Rats R210 (f), R222 (g), R231 (h) and R234 (i) each demonstrated a different revealed preference that was consistent within a rat across all sessions but differed among rats. Thresholds were fit for each flavor for each session. Each panel shows the mean fit threshold for a given rat, with s.e.m. over sessions. An important consideration is to control for the possibility that rats were waiting for a specific cue before leaving the zone. g 0 npg a r t I C l e S current site, the next site and the opposite site ( Fig. 2c) . All analyses were based on this categorization. All analyses used a leave-one-out approach so that the encounter being decoded was not included in the definition of the training set. Both OFC ( Fig. 2a ) and vStr ( Fig. 2b) were capable of reliably distinguishing between the current reward site ( Fig. 2c ) and the other sites ( Supplementary Fig. 8 ). Shuffling the interspike intervals of the cells removed all of these effects. p(reward) and p(zone) calculated from shuffled data were consistently 0.14 (Supplementary Fig. 8 ).
Zone entry responses
Previous research has suggested that, in simple association tasks in which cues predict reward, both OFC and vStr cells respond to cues predictive of reward 12, 15, 24, 28, 31, 34, 35 . Both OFC and vStr neural ensembles distinguished the different zones both at the time of reward ( Fig. 2a-c ) and at the time of entering the zone (cue onset) ( Fig. 2d-f Figs. 8 and 9) . These representations were related; neural activity in OFC and vStr also predicted the reward type of the current zone during zone entry (cue onset) ( Fig. 2g-i and Supplementary Fig. 10 ). Shuffling the interspike intervals eliminated these effects ( Supplementary Fig. 11 ).
Both OFC and vStr responded strongly under conditions in which the rat determined the cost to be worth staying ( Fig. 3) (for example, when the delay was below threshold; Fig. 3a,b) . In contrast, neither structure represented expectations of reward under conditions in which the rat determined the cost to not be worth staying (that is, skips, when delay was above threshold; Fig. 3c,d ). This suggests that these structures were indicating expected value, and predicting future actions. To directly test this hypothesis, we compared reward-related decoding when the rat encountered a delay near threshold (threshold ±2 s) and either stayed to sample the feeder ( Supplementary Fig. 12a,b ) or skipped to proceed to the next reward option ( Supplementary Fig. 12c,d) . When the rat stayed (waiting for a reward), both OFC and vStr increased their representations of the current reward at the time of zone entry. In contrast, when the rat skipped the current reward, neither OFC nor vStr reliably represented the current reward or zone. Shuffling the interspike intervals of the cells removed these effects ( Supplementary Fig. 13 ).
Regret
Regret entails the recognition that one has made a mistake: that an alternative action would have been a better option to take 4,6 . As noted above, a regret-inducing situation requires that two properties be satisfied: (i) the undesirable outcome should be a result of the agent's previous action, and (ii) following the selection of an option, the outcome (value) of all options needs to be known, including the outcome (value) of the unselected options. Our task and behavior satisfies these conditions. Because the rats were time-limited on the Restaurant Row task, encountering a high-cost delay after not waiting through a low-cost delay means that skipping the low-cost delay was a particularly expensive missed opportunity. (a,b) p(reward) at each reward for OFC (a) and vStr (b), defining the training set for decoding as activity at reward delivery and the test set as activity at each moment surrounding reward delivery (shaded area, s.e.m.). The neural ensemble decoded the current reward reliably (distribution of current reward was determined to be significantly different, empirical cumulative distribution function, significant at α = 0.05). p(reward) is the posterior probability indicating the likelihood of representing a given reward flavor as calculated by the Bayesian decoding. (c) For a,b, the training set is the reward types and the test set is activity when the rat receives reward. Rat icon indicates that decoding aligned to reward delivery (when the rat is already at feeders). Filled-circle feeder locations indicate that the training set for the decoder is based on responses to reward delivery. Dashed lines indicate zone location. (d,e) p(zone) at each zone for OFC (d) and vStr (e), defining the training set for decoding as neuronal activity at zone entry and the test set as neuronal activity at each moment surrounding zone entry. The neural ensemble decoded the current zone reliably. p(zone) is the posterior probability indicating representation of a given zone entry as calculated by Bayesian decoding. (f) For d,e, the training set is zone entry and the test set is neuronal activity when the rat enters the zone, triggering the cue that signals the delay. Rat icon indicates that decoding is aligned to zone entry. Solid box indicates that the training set for the decoder is based on responses to zone entry. Open circles indicate reward locations. (g,h) p(reward) at each zone for OFC (g) and vStr (h), defining the training set for decoding as neuronal activity at reward delivery and the test set as neuronal activity at each moment surrounding zone entry. The neural ensemble at time of zone entry decoded the current reward type reliably. (i) For g,h the training set is the reward flavor and the test set is neuronal activity when the rat enters the zone, triggering the cue (tone). Rat icon indicates that decoding is aligned to zone-entry, as in f. Filled circles indicate that the training set is based on responses to reward-delivery, as in c. Dashed lines indicate zone location. a r t I C l e S In the Restaurant Row task, a rat would sometimes skip an offer that was less than that rat's threshold for that flavor on that day and then encounter an offer at the subsequent site that was greater than that rat's threshold for that flavor on that day. Because the delay is a cost and value is matched (by definition) at threshold, this sequence is one in which the rat skipped a low-cost offer, only to find itself faced with a high-cost offer. From the economic and psychology literature, we can identify these sequences as potential 'regret-inducing' situations 4, 6 . We can compare these conditions to control conditions that we would expect to induce disappointment rather than regret.
Literature suggests that during regret, there should be manifest changes in the rat's behavior and neurophysiology that reflect recognition of the missed opportunity, as well as subsequent behavioral choices that one might not have made normally. Theoretically, the key to regret is a representation of the action not taken 3, 5, 9, 36, 37 . This implies that there should be representations of the previous choice during the regret-inducing situations, particularly in contrast to control conditions that are merely disappointing.
Thus, we define a regret-inducing situation as one in which (i) the rat skipped a low-cost/high-value reward (delay less than measured threshold for that flavor for that day), and then (ii) the rat encountered a high-cost/low-value reward (delay greater than measured threshold for that flavor for that day). In this situation, the rat has made an economic mistake: if it had taken a different action (waited for that previous reward), it would have had a more valuable session. For consistency, we will refer to the opportunity in situation (i) as the previous zone or previous reward and the opportunity in situation (ii) as the current zone or current reward.
As noted above, one needs to differentiate regret-inducing sequences from sequences that are merely disappointing. By definition, a disappointing sequence occurs when one encounters a situation that is worse than expected, but not as a result of one's own agency. There are two controls that need to be taken into account, a control for the sequence of offers (control 1) and a control for the rat's actions (control 2).
To control for the sequence of offers, we took sequences in which the rat encountered the same sequence of offers, but took (stayed for) the first offer. This matched control should only induce disappointment (worse than expected, but not the fault of the rat) 7, 8 . Control 1 differs from the regret-inducing situation only in that the rat took the previous offer rather than skipping it. In summary, control 1 was defined as situations in which the delay at the previous zone was below threshold and the rat waited for reward, followed by an encounter at the current zone such that delay was above threshold. In this situation, the rat did not make a mistake (as it waited for reward at the previous zone); the delay at the current zone was merely worse than the rat was willing to wait for, making the rat (presumably) disappointed. Control 1 controls for the sequence observed by the rat.
To control for the rat's actions, we took sequences in which the offer at the previous zone was greater than threshold (and skipped) and, again, the rat encountered a higher-than-threshold offer at the current zone. In this second control condition, the rat skipped the previous offer, but that was the 'correct' action to take, as the previous offer was above threshold. This second control condition should also induce disappointment because the rat has encountered two high-cost offers in a row. But this second control condition should not induce regret, because the rat's actions were consistent with its revealed preferences. Control 2 differs from the regret-inducing situation only in that the delay at the previous offer was above rather than below threshold. In summary, control 2 was defined as situations in which the delay at the previous zone was above threshold, followed by an encounter at the current zone such that delay was above threshold. In this situation, the rat did not make a mistake (since it skipped a high-cost delay at the previous zone), but the delay at the current zone was worse than the rat was willing to wait for, making the rat (presumably) disappointed. Control 2 controls for the reward sequence seen by the rat.
Potential regret and control instances were found within each session by comparing the delays at each of the zones to the threshold of that zone for that rat for that day. Regret instances and control instances were evenly distributed throughout each session across all rats. The distribution of the high-cost offers at the current zone did not differ between the potential regret-inducing sequences and matched controls (Supplementary Fig. 14) .
Behaviorally, rats paused and looked backwards toward the previous option upon encountering a potentially regret-inducing sequence, but they did not do so in either control condition (Fig. 4) . We identified pause-and-look events as points at which the rat's path showed high curvature and derived an orientation (see Online Methods). During potential regret-inducing sequences, rats were more likely to look backwards toward the previous option ( Fig. 4d ) than during either of the matched control conditions (Fig. 4e,f) (P = 0.00042, Watson's circular U test). In the first control condition (where the rat took a good offer and then encountered a bad offer), the rat tended to look toward the current spoke (zone) but then skip it and go on to the next zone. In the second control condition (where the rat encountered two bad offers in a row), the rat tended to look toward the next zone. Thus, there was a behavioral difference, implying that the rats recognized these three situations differently.
During potential regret instances, individual reward-responsive neurons in OFC and vStr showed activity patterns more consistent with the previous reward than the current one ( Fig. 5) . Neural activity peaked immediately after the start of the look back toward the previously skipped, low-cost reward. To quantify these changes in representation during regret-inducing situations and disappointment-inducing controls, we examined the population dynamics using a Bayesian decoding algorithm. Population decoding analyses offer insight into the dynamics of neural population. Ensemble activity more accurately represents the dynamics of the entire population compared to that of a single cell. To determine the neural population representation during these situations, we measured the Bayesian representations of p(reward) and p(zone) from the ensemble including all cells. While our first inclination was to look for representations of the missed reward, human subjects self-report that they regret actions taken or not more than they do missed outcomes 3, 5, 9, 36 . We did find a weak representation of the missed reward (not significant; OFC, P = 0.006 after taking four potential decoding signals into account (multiple comparisons); vStr, P = 0.0006 after taking four potential decoding signals into account (multiple comparisons); see Supplementary Fig. 15 ). However, we found that there were strong representations of the previous decision point (p(zone)) that were significantly different from those of all other zones (outside the 95% confidence igure 4 Behavioral responses in regret-inducing and control situations. All passes were rotated so as to align on entry into a current zone. Orientation was measured using the curvature measure as per the Online Methods. (a-c) Examples of approaches for each of the three conditions: regret-inducing, control 1 (same sequence but rat took previous option) and control 2 (two long delays in a row). Gray dots show all behavioral tracking samples from the example session. Blue dots show the current path taken in each example. The colors of the arrows correspond to the matching circular vector plots. Arrow directions indicate empirically determined curvature direction. In a regret-inducing example (a), when the rat entered the zone, he paused and looked backwards toward the previous zone. In a control 1 example (b), the rat looked toward the current reward spoke but proceeded on to the next zone. In a control 2 example (c), the rat looked toward the next zone but turned back toward the current reward.
(d-f) Summary statistics. The first reorientation event was measured as per the Online Methods. Gray traces show all pausing reorientations over all instances in that condition. Heavy line shows vector average in each 120° arc. In regret-inducing conditions (d), rats tended to orient toward the previous zone or current spoke. In control 1 conditions (e), rats tended to orient only toward the current spoke. In control 2 conditions (f), rats tended to orient toward the next zone. The distributions in d-f were significantly different from each other (Watson's circular U; see text). The rat traveled in a counterclockwise direction. The maze has been aligned so that the current zone is represented by the bottom right zone. This particular cell responded most to entry into the cherry reward zone, little to entry into the banana reward zone. When the rat skipped a low-cost cherry zone opportunity and encountered a high-cost banana zone opportunity, the rat looked back toward the previous reward, and the activity of the cell approximated that of the cherry zone-entry response. Bottom (display same as top panel): vStr example cell during a regret-inducing situation after skipping the chocolate reward zone and arriving at the cherry reward zone. npg a r t I C l e S interval as determined by empirical cumulative distribution function) ( Fig. 6a-c) . This differentiation of the previous zone was not observed in either control condition. In the first control (same sequence), both OFC and vStr demonstrated increased representations of the next zone ( Fig. 6d-f) . By definition, these control instances were high-cost encounters with the current reward site (for example, encountering a delay above threshold) and thus the rats were likely to skip them. In the second control condition (two bad offers), the representations of both the current and previous zones increased and were different from the representations of other rewards ( Fig. 6g-i) . However, this response was markedly different from that seen during potential regret instances, as the increase in representation of the previous zone could not be differentiated from the increase in representation of the current zone. Shuffling interspike intervals eliminated all of these effects (Fig. 6) . Other, more positive situations (rejecting a low-cost previous offer and then encountering a low-cost offer or rejecting a high-cost offer and then encountering a low-cost offer) both led to strong representations of the current zone (Supplementary Fig. 16 ). In addition, when rats stayed for an above-threshold delay but then encountered a below-threshold delay (which could be described as a potential regret-inducing condition), we again found increased representations of the previous zone (Supplementary Fig. 17) . The representations of the previous zone in this condition were smaller when compared to the previously described regret-inducing condition.
Thus, the rats showed different behaviors and different neurophysiological representations during regret-inducing situations, both of which reflected the information processing we would expect to see during regret. As noted above, an important role of regret in decision-making is that it changes subsequent decisions [37] [38] [39] . Consistent with this hypothesis, we found that rats were more likely to stay at the high-cost option in a regret-inducing situation than under either control condition (versus first control condition, P = 0.01; versus second control condition, P = 0.06; Wilcoxon, Fig. 7a ). In addition, rats spent less time eating the food before proceeding on to the next reward site following regretinducing situations as compared to non-regret situations (Fig. 7b) . The handling time distributions were significantly different (regret condition versus all non-regret conditions, Wilcoxon, P << 0.001). After waiting for food through a long delay in a regret-inducing situation, rats rushed through eating and quickly went on to their next encounter.
The hypothesis that the neural representation of the previous zone reflects some information processing related to regret implies that Figure 6 Neural representations in OFC and vStr represent the previous zone during behavioral regret instances. (a,b) In regret-inducing conditions, the p(zone) representation of the previous encounter was high after zone entry into the current zone for both OFC (a) and vStr (b) (shaded areas, s.e.m.). Green traces show decoding using shuffled inter-stimulus intervals. Decoding to the previous zone was significantly different from all other conditions, even after controlling for multiple comparisons (ANOVA; OFC, P << 0.001; vStr, P << 0.001; distribution significantly different as determined by empirical cumulative distribution function, significant at α = 0.05). (c) The conditions being decoded in a,b: the rat has skipped the previous offer, even though the delay was less than threshold for that restaurant, and has now encountered a delay greater than threshold for the current restaurant. (d-f) In the control 1 condition, the p(zone) representation of the current zone increased until the rat heard the cue indicating a long delay, at which time the representation changed to reflect the next zone. In control 1, p(zone) representations of the current and next zones were significantly different from the other zones (ANOVA; vStr, P << 0.001; OFC, P << 0.001), although they were not different from each other after controlling for multiple comparisons (ANOVA; vStr, P = 0.074; OFC, P = 0.619). OFC (d), vStr (e) and cartoon indicating condition (f). (g-i) In the control 2 condition, the p(zone) representations of both the current and previous zones increased when the rat heard the cue indicating a long delay (compared to other zones, ANOVA; OFC, P << 0.001; vStr, P << 0.001). OFC (g), vStr (h) and cartoon indicating condition (i). Decodings to the current and previous zones in control 2 were not significantly different from each other (ANOVA; OFC, P = 0.509; vStr, P = 0.268). there should be a relationship between that representation of the previous zone and the rat's subsequent actions. The hypothesis predicts that a stronger representation of the previous zone would lead to an increased likelihood of taking the high-cost (current) offer. To determine whether there was a relationship between a rat's willingness to take the high-cost offer and the neurophysiological representations, we compared the ratio of representations of the previous and the current zones and categorized these representations by stay or skip decisions at the current zone. This ratio was increased when the rat decided to stay, but only in the regret-inducing situations (Fig. 8) .
The ratio was unrelated to the decision to stay in the two control conditions. In regret-inducing situations, rats were more willing to stay on trials in which they showed an increased representation of the previous zone relative to the current zone.
DISCUSSION
Regret is the introspective recognition that a previously chosen action led to a less desirable outcome than an alternative action would have.
The two keys to identifying regret are value and agency. The Restaurant Row task, in which rats made economic (value-related, cost-dependent) decisions allowed us to identify potentially regret-inducing situations. First, the Restaurant Row task was an economic task, in which rats revealed economic preferences just as human and nonhuman primates do 14, 40, 41 . Second, because the rats had a limited time budget, encountering a bad (above-threshold) offer after skipping a good (below-threshold) offer meant that the rat had missed an opportunity. By standard economic and psychological definitions, this sequence should induce regret 4, 6, 9 . We were able to identify two matched sets of controls that should induce disappointment but not regret: (1) situations in which the rat encountered a similar sequence of offers but took the previous low-cost option and (2) situations in which the rat encountered two above-threshold offers and skipped the previous high-cost option.
Our data indicate that behavioral and neurophysiological differences between the potential regret-inducing situations and the controls were consistent with a hypothesis that the rats were expressing something akin to human regret. During the regret-inducing situation, rats looked backwards toward the previous (missed) goal and the OFC and vStr were more likely to represent that previous goal. After it, rats were more likely to wait out the (current) high-cost offer, and they rushed through handling their reward when they did. Interestingly, we found that the neurophysiological representations of counterfactual information in the regret-inducing situation were more strongly related to the missed action (activity when the action was taken, measured by p(zone)) than to the missed outcome (activity when the reward was received, measured by p(reward)). This is consistent with data that humans express more regret about the actions taken (or not taken) than about the missed outcomes 3, 5, 9, 36, 37 .
The Restaurant Row task had three features that made it particularly well suited to the identification of regret. First, it is an economic task on which rats reveal preferences. Second, the inclusion of four 'restaurants' allowed us to differentiate a general representation of other rewards from a specific representation of the mistaken choice. We found a clear and significant representation of the previous (lost) zone, but not the next or opposite zones. Third, the Restaurant Row task separates the choice of waiting (staying) or going (skipping) from reward receipt. This separation allowed us to differentiate the regretinduced representation of the previous (lost) reward (a small effect) from the regret-induced representation of the previous (mistaken) action (a large effect). Regret is more about the things you did or did not do than about the rewards you lost 5, 9, 36 .
Previous evidence indicates that rats can combine information to form an expectation of a novel reward (imagining a particular outcome) and that both OFC 16, 17, 42 and vStr (if a model in the evaluation steps of the task exists) contribute to this process 23, 24 . Our data indicate that violation of an expectation initiates a retrospective comparison (regretting a missed opportunity). As with the prospective calculation of expectation, this retrospective calculation of expectation influences future behavior: rats are more willing to wait for reward after a regret instance. These two processes, the act of imagining future outcomes and the process of regretting previous poor choices, are both necessary to modify future decisions to maximize reward. While some evidence suggests that OFC represents economic value 14 , the representation of regret is more consistent with the hypothesis that OFC encodes the outcome parameters of the current, expected or imagined state [15] [16] [17] 23 . The data presented here are also consistent with the essential role of OFC in proper credit assignment [43] [44] [45] . Previous studies have identified potential representations of the counterfactual could-have-been-chosen option in rats 25 , monkeys 19 and humans 11 . In humans, representations of the value of the alternative outcome increase activity in OFC as measured by functional magnetic resonance imaging 1,11 . Abe and Lee 19 found that there were Regret-inducing ratio of previous to current by stays and skips To determine whether the representations of previous reward were different when the rat chose to stay at the high-delay (high-cost) current zone, we measured the ratio between the p(zone) representation of the previous zone against the p(zone) representation of the current zone from 0 to 3 s following zone entry for all conditions in the event that the rat skipped or stayed. Each panel shows a box plot of the distribution of p(zone previous )/ p(zone current ) ratios divided between stays and skips. Box limits are 25th and 75th percentiles, whiskers extend to data not considered outliers and outliers are plotted separately. (a) p(zone previous )/p(zone current ) ratios from OFC ensembles during regret-inducing conditions. (b) p(zone previous )/ p(zone current ) ratios from vStr ensembles during regret-inducing conditions. (c,d) During control 1 conditions. (e,f) During control 2 conditions. Following regret inducing instances, when rats were more willing to wait for reward, p(zone previous ) was greater than p(zone current ). npg a r t I C l e S representations of an untaken alternative option in monkey OFC on a cued decision-making task in which the alternative option that should have been taken was cued to the monkey after the incorrect decision. The connectivity between OFC and vStr remains highly controversial, with some evidence pointing to connectivity [46] [47] [48] and other analyses suggesting a lack of connectivity 49, 50 . The anatomical and functional mechanisms through which the OFC and vStr derive their representations of regret-related counterfactual information remains unknown. In addition, the analyses used here lack the temporal resolution necessary to determine any interactions between structures.
The Restaurant Row task introduced here allowed economic measures to identify potential regret-inducing situations, in which the rat made a decision that placed it in a less valuable situation. Because the task was time limited, any decision to wait for a reward decreased the amount of time available to receive future rewards. Human subjects self-report that they regret actions taken or not taken more than they do missed outcomes 3, 5, 9, 36 . Intriguingly, during regret-inducing situations our decoding results showed strong representations of the previous zone entry, where the decision was made and the action taken (p(zone)), but weak and nonsignificant representations of the missed outcome (p(reward)). Most hypotheses suggest that the function of regret is a revaluation of a past opportunity that drives future behavioral changes 4,6 . After making a mistake and recognizing that mistake, rats were more likely to take a high-cost option and rush through the consumption of that less-valuable option.
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